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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's order dismissing the Information
charging Phillip Milton Ruggiero with three counts of preparing false evidence
based on the court's erroneous conclusion that Ruggiero's conduct was
protected by the First Amendment.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In Ada County Case No. CR-MD-2011-13936, the state charged Ruggiero
with stalking. (See R., p.80.) In that case, three letters were submitted to the
magistrate that were typewritten and were purportedly from Lisa Roggenbuck,
the victim of the alleged stalking, a "Spearmint Rhino Bouncer," and Jenn
Higginson.

(R., pp.11-13, 80.)

All three letters support the proposition that

Ruggiero was not guilty of the stalking charge alleged in Case No. CR-MD-20110013936. (Id.)
Based on the three letters submitted in Case No. CR-MD-2011-0013936,
the state in this case charged Ruggiero with, and he was bound over to district
court on, three counts of preparing false evidence in violation of I.C. § 18-2602.
(R., pp.41-43.) In district court, Ruggiero filed a motion to dismiss arguing "there
was not substantial evidence presented at the preliminary hearing ... that the
defendant committed the crime for w~1ich he has been held to answer."

(R.,

pp.60-61; see also pp.63-68 (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss).)
The court conducted a hearing on Ruggiero's motion. (See generally Tr.)
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Three days later, Ruggiero filed a "Supplemental Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss," asserting I.C. § 18-2602 is unconstitutional. (R., pp.8590.) More specifically, Ruggiero argued the statute (1) infringed upon his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech, and (2) is "void for vagueness and thus
invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"
pp.85-90.)

(R.,

The district court concluded the statute violated Ruggiero's First

Amendment rights, concluding "I.C. § 18-2602, in the context of criminalizing a
false or forged letter sent to a judge who is not ethically permitted to consider the

ex parte communication for any reason punishes falsity alone and runs afoul of'
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct.
2537 (2012).

(R., p.102.)

The court, therefore, granted Ruggiero's motion to

dismiss. (R., p.102.)
The state filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.103-106.)
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ISSUE

Did the district court err in granting Ruggiero's motion to dismiss after
erroneously concluding that his alleged acts of preparing false evidence were
protected by the First Amendment?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Granting Ruggiero's Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
The state charged Ruggiero with three counts of preparing false evidence

in violation of I.C. § 18-2602 for submitting three letters to the magistrate
presiding over I-1is misdemeanor stalking case that falsely purported to be from
three different individuals offering information indicating that Ruggiero was not
guilty of the charged stalking offense. Ruggiero moved to dismiss the charges,
arguing, in part, that I.C. § 18-2602 is an unconstitutional infringement on First
Amendment rights and void for vagueness.

(R., pp. 85-90.) The district court

granted Ruggiero's motion to dismiss, reasoning:

"As applied in this instance,

I.C. § 18-2602 is being used to punish a false statement which could not be used
in evidence and which could not be used to gain any material advantage."
p.101.)

1

(R.,

"Thus," the court concluded, "I.C. § 18-2602, in the context of

criminalizing a false or forged letter sent to a judge who is not ethically permitted
to consider the ex parte communication for any reason punishes falsity alone
and runs afoul of' the Supreme Court's opinion in Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537. (R.,
p.102.)

1

While Ruggiero seemed to argue that I.C. § 18-2602 is facially unconstitutional,
the district court's ruling was based on an as-applied determination. (R., p.101
("As applied in this instance, I.C. § 18-2602 is being used to punish a false
statement which could not be used in evidence and which could not be used to
gain any material advantage.").) It is this ruling that the state challenges on
appeal; however, any claim that I.C. § 18-2602 is facially invalid also lacks merit
because I.C. § 18-2602 does not prohibit any constitutionally protected conduct.
4

The district court's ruling was erroneous because Ruggiero's alleged
conduct, prohibited by I.C. § 18-2602, is not protected by the First Amendment.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct App. 2001).

C.

Ruggiero's Alleged Acts Of Preparing False Evidence Are Not Protected
Bv The First Amendment
Idaho Code§ 18-2602 states:
Every person guilty of preparing any false or antedated book,
paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, with
intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or
deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding or
inquiry whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of [a] felony.
The district court concluded that application of this statute, as applied to

the state's allegation that Ruggiero submitted false letters to the presiding judge
regarding the merits of the stalking charge in Case No. CR-MD-2011-13936, was
unconstitutional because it was "being used to punish" "falsity alone" since the
judge would not be "ethically permitted to consider the ex parte communication
for any reason." (R., pp.101-02.) According to the district court, this "runs afoul"
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Alvarez, supra.

(R., p.102.)

The district

court's interpretation of I.C. § 18-2602 was erroneous and its reliance on Alvarez
misplaced.
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"As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content."

Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2543 (quotations, brackets, and

citation omitted). Thus, content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively
invalid and will not be upheld unless the government can demonstrate the
restrictions comport with the constitution.

~

at 2544. These principles are not

threatened by I.C. § 18-2602 because the statute does not "restrict expression
because of its message."

~

at 2543 It restricts preparing false evidence "with

intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent or deceitful
purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding or inquiry ... authorized
by law."

I.C. § 18-2602.

Thus, contrary to the district court's reasoning, the

statute does not penalize "falsity alone." Whether the magistrate to whom the
letters were addressed could have considered them is completely irrelevant to
Ruggiero's intent in submitting the letters, which is what the statute criminalizes.
The First Amendment does not protect the creation of false evidence with intent
that it be considered by a court. Alvarez does not compel a different conclusion.
At issue in Alvarez was the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act of
2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), which reads:
(b)
FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT OF MILITARY
DECORATIONS OR MEDALS. - Whoever falsely represents
himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any
decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces
of the United States ... shall be fined under this title, imprisoned
not more than six months, or both.
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Alvarez at 2543 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)). Subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. § 704
further provides for enhanced penalties where the representation relates to a
Congressional Medal of Honor. 18 U.S.C. § 704(c)(1). Alvarez at 2543.
Alvarez challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 704 after the
Government filed charges against him for telling fellow board members of the
Three Valley Water District Board, wr1ich is a governmental entity, that he was
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Alvarez at 2542.

In considering

Alvarez's First Amendment challenge to the Stolen Valor Act, the Court found the
Act "targets falsity and nothing more."

&

at 2545. The Court explained:

The Act by its plain terms applies to a false statement made at any
time, in any place, to any person. . . . [This] sweeping, quite
unprecedented reach of the statute puts it in conflict with the First
Amendment. Here the lie was made in a public meeting, but the
statute would apply with equal force to personal, whispered
conversations within a home. The statute seeks to control and
suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless
times and settings. And it does so entirely without regard to
whether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain.
Alvarez at 2547 (citations omitted).
The differences between the Stolen Valor Act and I.C. § 18-2602 are
readily apparent. Unlike the Stolen Valor Act, I.C. § 18-2602 does not prohibit
specific speech on "one subject in almost limitless times and settings" and
"without regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of material gain."
Nor does I.C. § 18-2602 target "falsity alone." As noted, its reach is limited to a
specific setting where the statement is offered for a particular purpose.

The

district court's reliance on Alvarez to support the conclusion that I.C. § 18-2602
violates the First Amendment was erroneous.
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Further, as recognized by the Court in Alvarez, there are circumstances
where false speech may be prohibited. 132 S.Ct. at 2546. The most relevant
examples to this case are those statutes that prohibit perjury and other
fraudulent statements. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. at 2544, 2546. Perjury statutes are
"unquestion[ably] constitutional[ ]" because "[p]erjury undermines the function
and province of the law and threatens the integrity of judgments that are the
basis of the legal system."

lfl at

2546 (citations omitted). Similarly, "[s]tatutes

that prohibit falsely representing that one is speaking on behalf of the
Government, or that prohibit impersonating a Government officer, also protect
the integrity of Government processes, quite apart from merely restricting false
speech."

lfl

The same can be said of I.C. § 18-2602. Preparing false evidence

"with intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced, for any fraudulent or
deceitful purpose" in a proceeding authorized by law "undermines the function
and province of the law" and impairs the "integrity of Government processes."
As such, the prohibition on such conduct is constitutionally permissible.
The district court's conclusion that application of I.C. § 18-2602 to
Ruggiero's actions penalizes falsity alone and was therefore an unconstitutional
infringement on Ruggiero's First Amendment rights was erroneous. The district
court's order dismissing the charges against Ruggiero should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's Order
Re: Motion to Dismiss.
th

DATED this 17 day of January 2 0 1 3 ~ ~
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